In the context of monopolistic nonlinear pricing, we compare the maximum pro…ts of bundling, incremental discounts, and all-units discounts. When the number of pricing blocks is unrestricted, incremental discounts perform weakly the worst. However, if the performance of incremental discounts is not strictly worse when the number of blocks is unrestricted, then it performs the best when the number of blocks is restricted. It is because incremental discounts have the smallest "implementation power" and the largest "approximation power."
Introduction
We revisit Maskin and Riley (1984) Figure 1 : Bundle (left), Incremental discounts (middle) and All-units discounts (right) and the consumers'types are private information. If the monopolist is free to adopt any pricing scheme to maximize pro…t, the optimal (or second best) solution is now well known. However, in this continuous type model, the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme is complicated, at least far more complicated than what we observe in reality. What if the monopolist has to use a pricing scheme that is in some "practical" form (e.g. o¤ering a menu of two-part tari¤s)? Given a practical form, what are the restrictions it put on the set of feasible outcomes? How should the monopolist choose among di¤erent practical forms of pricing schemes?
To tackle these issues, we need to be more precise about what forms of pricing schemes we consider practical. Our treatment to this has two levels. At the …rst level, the application part, we consider three forms of pricing schemes to be practical: bundling (BD) schemes, incremental discounts (ID) schemes, and all-units discounts (AD) schemes. These three forms are illustrated in Figure 1 . Under a BD scheme, illustrated in the left panel, only several quantities, each associated with a gross price, are o¤ered for consumers to choose. Under an ID scheme, illustrated in the middle panel, progressive discounts apply to incremental units when the order size exceeds certain thresholds. We also allow a …xed fee under an ID scheme. 1 Under an AD scheme, illustrated in the right panel, progressive discounts apply to all units when the order size exceeds certain thresholds. We also allow a minimum purchase under an AD scheme. 2 In our terminology, an AD scheme does not have a …xed fee; if it does (i.e., the vertical intercept of the right panel becomes non-zero), then we call it an all-units discounts with …xed fee (ADF) scheme. Notice that the three pricing schemes in Figure 1 have arguably the same level of complexity: each of them has three blocks, and can be characterized by six parameters. Indeed, under any of the three forms, a pricing scheme with n blocks requires 2n parameters to characterize. (Of course, ADF schemes require one more parameter for the …xed fee.) It then makes much sense to ask, with the same number of blocks, which of the three forms yields the highest pro…t for the monopolist.
The second level of our treatment is the general theory part. In this part we more generally deal with principal-agent model, where the meaning of practicality is ‡exible, and we develop a general theory that su¢ ces to analyze any particular form of pricing schemes, provided that it is in the "menu class" that we explain below. In order to motivate our general theory, notice that each of the aforementioned three forms of pricing schemes can be regarded as o¤ering a menu of simple tari¤ options for consumers to select. O¤ering a BD scheme with n blocks (or n points here) is equivalent to o¤ering n quantity-payment bundles. O¤ering an ID scheme with n blocks is equivalent to o¤ering n two-part tari¤s. 3 O¤ering an AD scheme with n blocks is equivalent to o¤ering n "minimum purchase tari¤s" (see Section 3). That makes it possible to build an elegant unifying framework to analyze all the three forms.
In the application part (Sections 2 -4), we …rst characterize outcomes implementable by BD, ID and ADF schemes, given any number of blocks n (Theorems 1, 2 and 3.) Those characterizations are special cases of the results in the general theory part. Then we derive many implications with our characterizations. First, when the number of blocks is unrestricted, i.e., n = 1, every incentive-compatible and individually rational outcome is implementable by BD schemes, and by ADF schemes. On the other hand, AD schemes (without …xed fee) can implement at least as many outcomes as ID schemes do. In this sense we say that BD and ADF have the largest and ID has the smallest "implementation power" among the three forms (Theorem 4) . It follows that when the number of blocks is unrestricted, ADF can attain the Maskin-Riley second best monopoly pro…t, and ID can never perform better than AD (Corollary 2).
Second, we derive the condition under which ID or AD can attain the second best pro…t, when the number of blocks is unrestricted (Corollary 3). It amounts to derive the condition under which the Maskin-Riley second best outcome is implementable by ID or AD schemes.
Third, if ID can attain the second best pro…t when the number of blocks is unrestricted, then it yields strictly higher pro…t than BD and ADF when the number of blocks is restricted, i.e., n < 1. Proving this result is harder because, given a …nite number n of blocks, the sets of outcomes implementable by BD, ID and ADF are not comparable (i.e., do not contain one another). However, it can be done by showing that, under the premise and given any outcome implementable by BD or ADF scheme with n blocks, there exists an outcome implementable by ID scheme with n blocks that better approximate the Maskin-Riley second best solution. In this sense, we say that ID has larger "approximation power" than BD and ADF (Theorem 5). The variations of implementation power and approximation power are closely related to trade-o¤s between control and ‡exibility, which we discuss in the concluding remarks.
The general theory part (Sections 5 and 6) generally analyzes forms of pricing schemes that can be described as a menu of tari¤ options, where the set of admissible tari¤ options C and the number of tari¤ options n in the menu are pre-determined. We introduce the concept of tari¤ single crossing property and tari¤ increasing di¤erences to characterize the set of outcomes implementable by such a menu given the number n and the set C (Theorems 6 -8). Such outcomes are said to be menu implementable with respect to (n; C). In general, restricting to o¤ering a menu makes the issue of incentive compatibility more severe. Hence menu implementability is strictly stronger than the ordinary incentive compatibility.
Our application part is related to the literature of monopolistic nonlinear pricing, which originated with Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984) . Few papers are concerned with comparison among suboptimal forms of pricing schemes, although Kolay and Sha¤er (2003) and Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) are exceptions. Both of these two papers assume that the monopolistic seller has constant marginal cost and the privately informed buyers have only two types. Kolay and Sha¤er (2003) show that the best BD scheme yields strictly higher pro…t than the best ID scheme. Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) show that the best AD scheme yields higher pro…t than the best ID scheme. While their results are in spirit consistent with our Corollary 2, our analyses di¤er from theirs most signi…cantly in that we assume a continuum of buyers'types but restrict the complexity level (i.e., number of blocks) of pricing schemes.
Although the use of AD in intermediate-goods markets is common, 4 there is little theoretical analysis on it in the literature, except Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) . Why does a seller use AD rather than ID? It has been informally argued that the use of AD is anticompetitive or exclusionary (to exclude entry of competitors, or induce downstream retailers to promote the products at the expense of other substitute products). 5 So one might wonder whether a monopolist without fear of competition would …nd AD superior. The implication of our results on this has two sides. First, in principle both AD and ID could perform better for a monopolist without fear of competition. But second, under certain conditions (which could be plausible in certain contexts but not in others) ID must outperform AD for such a monopolist. 6 Our general theory part is related to the literature of principal-agent models and mechanism design. O¤ering simple menus as a practical scheme is relevant in other principal-agent contexts (e.g. the ones in La¤ont and Martimort (2002)), where our general theory of menu implementability applies equally well. We list some works on this line. In the context of procurement contracting, Rogerson (2003) considers "Fixed Price Cost Reimbursement (FPCR) menus", that is, two-item menus where one item is a cost-reimbursement contract and the other item is a …xed-price contract, of which the principal allows the agent to pick one. He shows that, if the agent's utility is quadratic and the agent's type is distributed uniformly, then "the optimal FPCR menu always captures at least three-quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves." Chu and Sappington (2007) relax the assumption of uniform distribution, and show that a menu of two options, namely, a cost-reimbursement contract and a linear cost sharing contract, can always secure at least 73 percent of the gain. In the context of nonlinear pricing, Wilson (1993) claims that the loss due to limiting the number n of two-part tari¤s is of order 1=n 2 . Bergemann, Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2011) consider Mussa and Rosen (1978) quality di¤erentiation setting and show under "linear-quadratic speci…cation" that the loss resulting from the usage of a …nite n-class menu is of order 1=n 2 . Wong (2009) also considers Mussa and Rosen (1978) setting and shows that the marginal gain of increasing the number n is 4 According to Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) , AD is used by Coca-Cola, Irish Sugar British Airways, and Michelin. 5 See, for example, Tom, Balto, and Averitt (1999) . 6 For example, ID must outperform AD if the conditions in the …rst half of Remark 2 hold. But AD could outperform ID under the same conditions except that marginal cost is increasing. Consider the speci…cation in Example 1 with 1=2 < p 2=2 and large enough n.
diminishing, and of order 1=n 3 . Miravete (2007) uses a large sample of independent cellular telephone markets to structurally estimate a monopolistic nonlinear pricing model. His estimates suggests that "…rms should only o¤er few tari¤ options if the product development costs of designing them are non-negligible." The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 -4 are the application part. Section 2 formulates the monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem and presents some basic facts about it. Section 3 characterizes the set of outcomes implementable by BD, ID and ADF schemes. Section 4 compares the performances of these forms of pricing schemes. Sections 5 -6 are the general theory part. Section 5 generalizes the model in Section 2 into one that can be adapted to many other principal-agent settings. Section 6 presents our characterization of menu implementability. Section 7 concludes. The proofs not in the main text are in Appendix.
Monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem
Consider a monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem, in which each consumer's utility function is S (q; ) t where S : R + ! R is the consumer's gross utility function and t 2 R denotes the payment from the consumer to the monopolist. The argument q denotes the quantity consumed; the argument denotes the consumer's type (or preference parameter), whose domain is an interval ; . A consumer's type is her private information. The monopolist only knows the cumulative distribution function F of consumers' types, which has a positive density f on the support . Each consumer has an outside option (q; t) = (0; 0), i.e., buying nothing and paying nothing.
Given q and t, the monopolist's ex post (per-customer) pro…t is given by t c (q), where c : R + ! R is the monopolist's cost function. If each consumer of type buys quantity Q ( ) and pays T ( ), then the monopolist's ex ante (per-customer) pro…t is
Assumption 1 S and c are twice di¤erentiable. S (0; ) = 0 for all 2 . If q > 0, then S (q; ) > 0. Strict Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition: S q (q; ) > 0. 7
From the revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to outcomes (which can be thought of as direct revelation mechanisms) that are incentive-compatible and individually rational. Formally, an outcome, written as (Q; T ), is a pair of functions Q : ! R + and T : ! R. Q is called the quantity function and T the payment function of outcome (Q; T ). An outcome (Q; T ) is said to be incentive-compatible (IC) if for any ; 0 2 , we have
An outcome (Q; T ) is said to be individually rational (IR) if for any 2 , we have U ( ) S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) 0:
Fact 1 and Fact 2 below are well known and we state them without proof for future reference. It is well known that the payment function can be rewritten using IC as
and hence the pro…t (1) can be rewritten as
where H is the "virtual surplus function" de…ned as
If an outcome (Q ; T ) maximizes the monopolist's pro…t (1) subject to IC and IR, we say (Q ; T ) is a second best outcome, Q is a second best quantity function, and the associated pro…t, denoted as , is the second best pro…t. We assume that a second best outcome exists.
Fact 2
The second best pro…t can be written as
An outcome (Q ; T ) is second best if and only if Q ( ) solves problem (4) and
3 Bundling, incremental discounts, and all-units discounts If the monopolist is free to adopt any pricing scheme, then any IC and IR outcome is implementable and hence the monopolist maximum pro…t is the second best pro…t . This section studies the sets of implementable outcomes when the monopolist restricts itself to adopt bundling schemes, incremental discounts schemes, or all-units discounts schemes. The results in this and the next sections are proved (in Appendix) after our general theory of menu implementability (Section 6) is developed.
A bundling (BD) scheme is a menu of options o¤ered by the monopolist, with each option composed of a purchase quantity q 0 and a total payment t 2 R. Each consumer has to pick either one option in the menu, or the outside option. We say a BD scheme implements an outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers (which for each consumers'type assigns an option in the menu or the outside option to maximize consumers'utility) such that the outcome of this best response coincides with (Q; T ). If a BD scheme has at most n options (where n 2 N [ f1g, i.e., n is a nonnegative integer or the in…nity), then it is called an n-BD scheme.
Theorem 1 Take any n 2 N[f1g. An outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-BD scheme if and only if it is IC and IR, and Q takes at most n values except 0. If an outcome can be implemented by some n-BD scheme, we call it n-BDimplementable. We say an outcome is BD-implementable if it is 1-BD-implementable.
We turn to incremental discounts schemes. A two-part tari¤ characterized by (p; ) 2 R + R is a function that assigns each quantity q 2 R + the payment pq + . Of course, p and are the marginal price and the …xed fee of this two-part tari¤. An incremental discounts (ID) scheme is de…ned as a menu of two-part tari¤s o¤ered by the monopolist. Each consumer has to pick either a two-part tari¤ in the menu and a purchase quantity (and hence also a payment), or the outside option. We say an ID scheme implements an outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers (which for each consumers'type assigns a two-part tari¤ in the menu and a purchase quantity or the outside option to maximize consumers'utility) such that the outcome of this best response coincides with (Q; T ). If an ID scheme has at most n two-part tari¤s (where n 2 N [ f1g), then it is called an n-ID scheme.
Theorem 2 Take any n 2 N [ f1g. An outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ID scheme if and only if it is IC and IR, and for every 2 A f 2 : (Q ( ) ; T ( )) 6 = (0; 0)g there exists some P ( ) 2 R + such that 1. Q ( ) 2 arg max q 0 fS (q; ) P ( ) qg for every 2 A, 2. P is nonincreasing, and 3. P takes at most n values. If an outcome can be implemented by some n-ID scheme, we call it n-ID-implementable. We say an outcome is ID-implementable if it is 1-ID-implementable.
We turn to all-units discounts schemes. A minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (m; p; ) 2 R + R + R is a function that assigns each quantity q m the payment pq + . The parameters m, p and are called the minimum purchase, the marginal price and the …xed fee of this minimum purchase tari¤. An all-units discounts with …xed fee (ADF) scheme is de…ned as a menu of minimum purchase tari¤s o¤ered by the monopolist, such that the …xed fees of those minimum purchase tari¤s are the same. Each consumer has to pick either a minimum purchase tari¤ in the menu and a purchase quantity (and hence also a payment) that is no smaller than the associated minimum purchase, or the outside option. We say an ADF scheme implements an outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers such that the outcome of this best response coincides with (Q; T ). If an ADF scheme has zero …xed fee, we simply call it an all-units discounts (AD) scheme. If an ADF (or AD) scheme has at most n minimum purchase tari¤s (where n 2 N [ f1g), then it is called an n-ADF (or n-AD) scheme.
Theorem 3 Take any n 2 N [ f1g. Given 2 R, an outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ADF scheme with …xed fee if and only if it is IC and IR, and for every 2 A f 2 : (Q ( ) ; T ( )) 6 = (0; 0)g there exist some M ( ) 2 R + and P ( ) 2 R + such that θ Q(θ) If an outcome can be implemented by some n-ADF (or n-AD) scheme, we call it n-ADF-implementable (or n-AD-implementable). We say an outcome is ADF-
Theorems 1 -3 imply restrictions on outcomes that can be implemented by n-BD, n-ID and n-ADF (and hence n-AD) schemes. The left panels of Figures 2 -4 illustrate how the options in the menu has to be distributed to di¤erent types; the right panels illustrate the patterns of the associated quantity functions, where D (p; ) denotes the demand arg max q 0 fS (q; ) pqg. The following observations are important. Adopting an ID scheme, the induced quantity function cannot respond to type too little, because (i) within each block (corresponding to a two-part tari¤), the quantity function has to follow a "type-demand curve," which is increasing, and (ii) across blocks, the relevant "type-demand curve" can only shift up, since marginal price has to be nonincreasing in type. In contrast, adopting a BD scheme, the induced quantity function has to be ‡at within each block. (Of course the jumps have to be upward by incentive compatibility.) From this viewpoint, ADF (and also AD) stands between ID and BD. Adopting an ADF scheme, within a block, the induced quantity function can have both a ‡at portion when the minimum purchase is binding, and a "type-demand curve portion" when the minimum purchase is not binding.
Comparing Figures 2 -4 , one might suspect that, given the number of options n to be included in the menu, AD (even without …xed fee) can implement more general quantity functions than ID and BD can. But it is not true, because we are not totally free to choose the combination of the minimum purchases (m i 's), the marginal prices (p i 's) and the thresholds of AD schemes. The combination of those parameters has to make every marginal type between two blocks indi¤erent between picking the two minimum purchase tari¤s corresponding to the two blocks. After all, under AD we have the same degrees of freedom, namely 2n, as ID and BD. The comparison among the maximum pro…ts of the three forms is studied in the next section.
4 Comparison among the three forms of pricing schemes For each n 2 N [ f1g, let BD n denote the maximum monopolist pro…t that can be made by o¤ering some n-BD scheme. We de…ne ID n , AD n and ADF n similarly. For these maximum pro…ts to be well de…ned, we assume that corresponding optimal outcomes (i.e., outcomes that makes the highest pro…t among those implementable by the corresponding schemes) exist. Those optimal outcomes are called n-BD-optimal outcome, n-ID-optimal outcome, etc.; and those maximum pro…ts are called n-BDmaximum pro…t, n-ID-maximum pro…t, etc. If n = 1, we might simply call them BD-optimal outcome, ID-optimal outcome, BD-maximum pro…t, ID-maximum pro…t, etc.
Unrestricted number of options (n = 1)
From Theorem 1, any BD-optimal outcome is also a second best outcome, and BD 1 is also the second best pro…t . From Theorems 1 -3 one can immediately see that lim n!1 BD n
and lim n!1 AD n = AD 1 . 10 When the number of options in the menu is unrestricted (i.e., n = 1), we can rank the maximum pro…ts of BD, ID, ADF and AD because we can rank the corresponding sets of implementable outcomes. First of all, the set of outcomes implementable by BD schemes must be the largest: when the number of quantity-payment bundles is unrestricted, BD puts no restriction on implementable outcome except IC and IR. In other words, any IC and IR outcome is 1-BD-implementable. It follows that = BD 1 . The following characterizations of 1-ID-implementability and 1-ADimplementability are corollaries of Theorems 2 and 3.
Corollary 1 Let (Q; T ) be an IC and IR outcome that satis…es S (Q ( ) ; )
Proof. To see the su¢ ciency part of (a), suppose that the conditions hold. Denote the domain of P ID as A ID . Let T ( ) = S (Q ( ) ; ) R S (Q (x) ; x) dx, as suggested by (2). It is straightforward to verify that Q; T; A ID ; P ID satis…es conditions 1-2 in Theorem 2 and that A ID = f 2 : (Q ( ) ; T ( )) 6 = (0; 0)g. Therefore, (Q; T ) can be implemented by 1-ID scheme. To see the necessity part of (a), suppose that
Then Theorem 2 implies the conditions. (Note that (Q ( ) ; T ( )) 6 = (0; 0) is equivalent to Q ( ) > 0, from (2) and U ( ) S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) = 0.) Part (b) can be proved similarly by applying Theorem 3, with de…ning M ( )
10 It is because a monotonic function (e.g. Q in Theorem 1, P in Theorem 2, M and P in Theorem 3) can be arbitrarily well approximated by a step function.
Remark 1 In applications one often assume that S ( ; ) is nondecreasing and concave. If one do that, then part (a) of Corollary 1 can be simpli…ed as: (Q; T ) is 1-ID-implementable if and only if S q (Q ( ) ; ) (which equals T 0 ( ) =Q 0 ( ) when Q and T are di¤erentiable at ) is nonincreasing on f 2 : Q ( ) > 0g; and part (b) can be simpli…ed as:
The following theorem ranks di¤erent sets of implementable outcomes.
Theorem 4 Let (Q; T ) be an IC and IR outcome that satis…es S (Q ( ) ; )
Part (a) of Theorem 4 says that it is without loss to use ADF schemes if we only consider outcomes with nonnegative payment. Indeed, any such outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented by an ADF scheme as follows: Set a large transfer payment to buyers (i.e., negative …xed fee ) to induce consumers to participate; for every type with Q ( ) > 0, put in the menu a minimum-purchase tari¤ with Q ( ) being its minimum purchase, and with some P ( ) being its marginal price such that the resulting gross payment is T ( ) (i.e., P ( ) Q ( )+ = T ( )). Note that since the upfront transfer is large, the marginal price P ( ) must be large, so that the minimum-purchase tari¤ characterized by (Q ( ) ; P ( ) ; ) is e¤ectively the single quantity-payment bundle (Q ( ) ; T ( )). Therefore the above ADF scheme is e¤ectively the BD scheme that implements (Q; T ).
Part (b) of Theorem 4 can be informally understood as follows. Under any ID scheme, the e¤ective tari¤ function (i.e., minimum payment as a function of quantity) must be concave. In contrast, for an e¤ective tari¤ function to be generated by an AD scheme, it only has to have nonincreasing average per-unit price. If we only consider tari¤ functions with nonnegative payment for zero order size (which is natural in this monopolist context and is formally guaranteed by the condition S (Q ( ) ; )
T ( ) = 0), then it is geometrically easy to see that concavity is strictly stronger than nonincreasing average. That is, when the number of blocks is unrestricted, AD can generate strictly more tari¤ functions than ID can.
An alternative way to understand part (b) of Theorem 4 is recalling the insights from Figures 2 -4. Under ID, the induced quantity function cannot be too ‡at. When the number of blocks n tends to in…nity, the induced quantity function can become smooth, but still cannot be ‡atter than type-demand curve. In contrast, under BD any nondecreasing quantity function can be induced when n tends to in…nity. Under AD, which stands between BD and ID, induced quantity functions with portions ‡atter than type-demand curve are possible. In this sense, we say ID has the smallest "implementation power" among the three forms, while BD has the largest.
Proof. We have already claimed that = BD 1 . Since AD schemes are special cases of ADF schemes, we also have ADF 1 AD 1 . If an outcome (Q; T ) is second best, then it is IC and IR, and satis…es S (Q ( ) ; )
T ( ) = 0, then from part (a) of Theorem 4, (Q; T ) can be implemented by some ADF scheme. Therefore = ADF 1 . Now suppose that (Q; T ) is ID-optimal. Then it is implementable by some ID scheme and hence IC and IR. It also satis…es S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) = 0, for if S (Q ( ) ; )
T ( ) > 0, the monopolist could increase pro…t by raising the …xed fees of all two-part tari¤s. From part (b) of Theorem 4, (Q; T ) can be implemented by some AD scheme. Therefore AD 1 ID 1 .
Can ID or AD attain the second best pro…t? It amounts to apply Corollary 1 to check whether some second best outcome can be implemented by ID or AD scheme. In particular, if the second best outcome involves bunching (so that S q (Q ( ) ; ) is increasing in the bunching region), then it cannot be implemented by ID scheme.
Corollary 3 (a)
= ID 1 if and only if some second best quantity function Q satis-…es P ( ) S q (Q ( ) ; ) being nonnegative and nonincreasing on f 2 :
Proof. It is straightforward from Corollary 1.
Remark 2 A set of su¢ cient conditions for = ID (and hence = AD ) is: the cost function c is linear, the hazard rate F 0 ( ) = (1 F ( )) of types'distribution is nondecreasing, and consumers'utility takes the form s (q) t where s is a concave function. Another set of su¢ cient conditions for = AD on parameters is provided in Maskin and Riley (1984) Proposition 6 (known as quantity discounts result).
Example 1 Suppose that S (q; ) = s (q) and is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Let s ( ) and c ( ) take the following forms:
where 2 (0; 1) is a parameter (so that s is increasing and concave, and c is increasing and convex). Then the second best outcome is
Applying Corollary 3 and Remark 1, it is straightforward to verify that 
Restricted number of options (…nite n)
We now turn to the comparison among the three forms when the number of blocks is restricted to be no larger than a …nite n. It is a harder job because when n is …nite, the concepts of n-ID-implementability, n-ADF-implementability and n-BDimplementability do not imply one another. While the second best outcome cannot be implemented by any of the three forms when n is …nite, the key to compare their performances is to see which form can implement outcomes that better approximate the second best. While ID has the smallest implementation power (i.e., has the smallest set of implementable outcomes) when n = 1, we will nonetheless see that ID has the following advantage when n is …nite. If a second best outcome can be implemented by some ID scheme with in…nite blocks, then ID schemes with …nite blocks can be constructed to better approximate the second best outcome than AD schemes or BD schemes with the same number of blocks do. In this sense, we say ID has the largest "approximation power."
In this subsection we impose the following regularity assumptions on the virtual surplus function H, which ensure that second best outcome is essentially unique, and better approximating the second best outcome raises pro…t.
Assumption 2 H is continuous. arg max q 0 H (q; ) is single-valued and nondecreasing in . H ( ; ) is single-peaked (i.e., H (q; ) gets weakly higher when q gets closer to the unique maximizer).
Lemma 1 Let Q be a second best quantity function. Let (Q 1 ; T 1 ) and (Q 2 ; T 2 ) be two IC outcomes such that, for almost every 2 , either
Then the pro…t (1) generated by (Q 1 ; T 1 ) is weakly higher than that generated by (Q 2 ; T 2 ). The last inequality is strict unless S (Q 1 ( ) ; ) T 1 ( ) = S (Q 2 ( ) ; ) T 2 ( ) and
Proof. Under Assumption 2, fQ ( )g = arg max q 0 H (q; ) for all 2 except possibly and . Apply formula (3).
Theorem 5 Suppose that = ID 1 and n is any nonnegative integer. (a) ID n ADF n , and this inequality is strict unless some n-ID-optimal outcome coincides with some n-ADF-optimal outcome almost everywhere.
(b) ID n BD n , and this inequality is strict unless some n-ID-optimal outcome coincides with some n-BD-optimal outcome almost everywhere.
Remark 3 The condition
= ID 1 in Theorem 5 is crucial. We have seen in the last subsection that = ADF 1 = BD 1 and that ID 1 ; ADF 1 ; BD 1 are limits of ID n ; ADF n ; BD n . Therefore, if > ID 1 , we must have ID n < ADF n and ID n < BD n for all large …nite n.
Intuitively, if the second best is not intrinsically incompatible with ID, then for any scheme involving bunching, one can construct an ID scheme that has discontinuities for the same set of types, but over each block it allows better separation of types, and therefore more surplus.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 5 is the following. To show ID n ADF n , it amounts to show that, given an n-ADF-optimal outcome, there exists an n-IDimplementable outcome whose quantity function is uniformly closer to the second θ Q(θ) Q*(θ) Q ID (θ) Q ADF (θ) Figure 5 : Improving upon ADF by ID best than the quantity function of the n-ADF-optimal outcome. In fact, we do not need to know the characteristics of the n-ADF-optimal outcome except knowing that it is n-ADF-implementable. Let us …x n = 3 for example and start with some 3-ADFimplementable outcome. The bold curve in Figure 5 illustrates the quantity function Q ADF of such a 3-ADF-implementable outcome, and the thin curve illustrates the second best quantity function Q . Under the assumption = ID 1 , Q is drawn to cross every type-demand curve from below. (Recall that, for the second best outcome to be implementable by some ID scheme, Q cannot be ‡atter than typedemand curves.) Then we can draw a quantity function Q ID of a 3-ID-implementable outcome as shown by the dashed curve in Figure 5 . Notice that Q ID is uniformly closer to Q than Q ADF . Now according to Lemma 1, the 3-ID-implementable outcome Q ID ; T ID that leaves the lowest type of consumer a zero rent would make a higher pro…t than the original 3-ADF-implementable outcome does. Therefore ID n ADF n . We can similarly argue that ID n BD n under the assumption = ID 1 .
Generalized environment
In this and the next sections, we develop a unifying framework that can simultaneously analyze all the practical forms of pricing schemes studied in this paper. Moreover, this framework works in a much more general environment, which we describe in this section. The results in the next section, which are applied to prove the results in Section 3, relies only on the assumptions made in this section. Consider a more general monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem. The domain for quantities is denoted as , which can be any closed subset of R that includes 0. The monopolist's cost function c : ! R and the cumulative distribution function F of consumers'types are irrelevant, except that the support of F still has to be an interval = ; . Consumers'utility is still in the form S (q; ) t, and consumers'outside option is still buying nothing and paying nothing. For the gross utility function
S :
! R, all we need are the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 S (0; ) = 0 for all 2 . For any q 2 , S (q; ) is absolutely continuous (and hence almost everywhere di¤erentiable) in . For any 2 , S (q; ) is continuous in q. Moreover, S satis…es strictly increasing di¤erences in (q; ), i.e., q 1 q 2 and 1 2 imply S (q 2 ; 2 ) S (q 1 ; 2 ) S (q 2 ; 1 ) S (q 1 ; 1 ) ; and the inequality becomes strict whenever q 1 < q 2 and 1 < 2 .
Note that this general framework allows quantity to be discrete or continuous, and Assumption 3 is very weak, so that our results can be adapted to many other principal-agent settings. The only essential restriction in Assumption 3 is its last sentence, which is the strict Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property. Also note that Assumption 3 is enough to imply Fact 1.
We now formalize the concepts of tari¤ option. A tari¤ option is a function that assigns each quantity q 2 a total payment (q) 2 R [ f1g for purchasing q units, such that (q) < 1 for some q 2 , and lim inf x!q (x) > 1 for all q 2 . 11 The interpretation of (q) = 1 is that purchasing q units is not allowed by the tari¤ option . The set
is called the domain of , whose interpretation is the set of order sizes allowed by .
Notice that our concept of tari¤ option is a general one: we formally allow the payment associated with an order size to be in…nity to forbid that order size; we also allow the payment to be negative, provided that it never converges to negative in…nity. In this terminology, the consumers'outside option is also a tari¤ option. We use out to denote the tari¤ option that represents the outside option, i.e.,
Let C be a class of tari¤ options, which is meant to be the class of "admissible" tari¤ options that the monopolist can put into a menu for the consumers to choose.
De…nition 1 We say an outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C) (where n 2 N [ f1g and C is a class of tari¤ options) if it is induced by a menu of at most n tari¤ options in C, i.e., there exist some set (menu) M C with jMj n and some mapping (best response of consumers) that assigns each consumers'type 2 a tari¤ option 2 M [ f out g such that 1. T ( ) = (Q ( )) for any 2 , 2. S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) S (q; ) (q) for any 2 , q 2 , 2 M [ f out g.
Implementability by n-BD schemes, by n-ID schemes, and by n-ADF schemes are all special cases of the above menu implementability with respect to (n; C). For n-BD schemes, C is the set of all tari¤ options with singleton domain. For n-ID schemes, C is the set of all two-part tari¤s. For n-ADF schemes with …xed fee , C is the set of all minimum purchase tari¤s with common …xed fee .
In order to characterize our concept of menu implementability, we introduce some notions. For any two tari¤ options 1 and 2 , we say ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property if for any q 1 ; q 2 2 ( 1 ) [ ( 2 ) with q 1 < q 2 , we have
That is, 1 (q) 2 (q), regarded as a function of q and restricted on ( 1 ) [ ( 2 ), crosses or touches zero only once and only from below. The interpretation is that 2 is more favorable to purchasing large quantities than 1 .
For any two tari¤ options 1 and 2 , we say ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences if 1 (q) 2 (q) is nondecreasing in q on ( 1 ) [ ( 2 ). Another way to say that is: ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences i¤ ( 1 ; 2 + x) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property for any x 2 R. The interpretation is that 2 is more favorable to purchasing incremental units than 1 .
It is easy to see that if ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences, then it satis…es tari¤ single crossing property.
Theorem 6 An outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C) if it is IC and IR, and for every 2 there exists some tari¤ option 2 C [ f out g such that 1. T ( ) = (Q ( )) for any 2 , 2. S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) S (q; ) (q) for any 2 , q 2 , 3. increasing di¤erences monotonicity: if 1 < 2 then ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences, 4. f g 2 n f out g n.
Theorem 7 Theorem 6 still holds if condition 3 is replaced by 3'a. single crossing monotonicity: if 1 < 2 then ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property, 3'b. T ( ) 0 (Q ( )) for any ; 0 2 .
Theorems 6 and 7 can be informally understood as follows. If the monopolist is free to o¤er any pricing scheme, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to o¤ering a direct revelation mechanism (Q; T ) (which asks consumers to report types and speci…es a quantity-payment bundle for each reported type) that satis…es incentive compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint (so that it is equivalent to BD schemes). Now the monopolist is restricted to o¤ering a menu of tari¤ options in C, then it is only without loss of generality to restrict attention to o¤ering a revelation mechanism (the mapping 7 ! in Theorem 6) that speci…es for each reported type a tari¤ option in C [ f out g, after which the consumer is free to choose any order size allowed by the chosen tari¤ option.
The issue of individual rationality simply does not change. The issue of incentive compatibility now has two parts. First, the consumer should be willing to choose the desired order size given the tari¤ option designated for her. This part is condition 2 in Theorem 6. Second, the consumer should be willing to choose the tari¤ option designated for her (i.e., report the true type). This second part is stronger than requiring (Q; T ) to be incentive-compatible. Since a direct revelation mechanism speci…es a particular quantity-payment bundle once a consumer's type has been reported, so a consumer has an incentive to report a false type only if she prefers the quantity-payment bundle designated for that false type. In contrast, under a revelation mechanism 7 ! which speci…es a tari¤ option after reporting, a consumer has some ‡exibility to choose the quantity-payment bundle after a type has been reported, as long as the tari¤ option speci…ed for that reported type is not degenerate. Hence a consumer has an incentive to report a false type whenever she prefers any quantity-payment bundle allowed by the tari¤ option designated for that false type.
Then what condition can guarantee this second part? Under a direct revelation mechanism, it is well known that incentive compatibility requires monotonicity: higher type consumers should purchase more. Under the aforementioned revelation mechanism 7 ! , it turns out that a natural extension of this monotonicity suf-…ces: higher type consumers should pick tari¤ options that are favorable to purchasing more. The latter is formalized by increasing di¤erences monotonicity (i.e., condition 3 in Theorem 6). If we replace increasing di¤erences monotonicity by the related but weaker condition single crossing monotonicity (i.e., condition 3'a in Theorem 7), then the additional condition 3'b in Theorem 7 is needed.
Remark 4 Notice that in Theorems 6 and 7, condition 3'b clearly has to be satis-…ed anyway (for to be the consumers' best response). So actually condition 3, together with other conditions, implies condition 3'(including 3'a and 3'b). However, the su¢ ciency of condition 3 is worth knowing on top of knowing the su¢ ciency of condition 3', because for some applications condition 3 is more useful. Indeed, in our applications in Section 3, checking increasing di¤erences monotonicity is not harder than checking single crossing monotonicity and hence we do not need to worry about condition 3'b.
The necessity counterparts of Theorems 6 and 7 require some restrictions on C [ f out g. We say C [ f out g is closed if it is closed under the product topology in the space of tari¤ options (i.e., whenever a net in C [ f out g pointwise converges to a tari¤ option, this tari¤ option is also in C [ f out g.) For any two tari¤ options 1 and 2 , we say 1 dominates 2 if 1 (q) 2 (q) for any q 2 , and the inequality is strict for some q 2 . We say C [ f out g is increasing di¤erences comparable if for any two tari¤ options 1 and 2 in C [ f out g which are not dominated by each other, either ( 1 ; 2 ) or ( 2 ; 1 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences. Similarly, we say C [ f out g is single crossing comparable if for any two tari¤ options 1 and 2 in C [ f out g which are not dominated by each other, either ( 1 ; 2 ) or ( 2 ; 1 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property.
Theorem 8 For an outcome (Q; T ) to be menu implementable with respect to (n; C), the su¢ cient conditions provided by Theorem 6 are also necessary if (i) n is …nite or C [f out g is closed, and (ii) C [f out g is increasing di¤erences comparable. Similarly, for an outcome (Q; T ) to be menu implementable with respect to (n; C), the su¢ cient conditions provided by Theorem 7 are also necessary if (i) n is …nite or C [ f out g is closed, and (ii') C [ f out g is single crossing comparable.
Theorems 6 and 8 can be translated into necessary and su¢ cient conditions for implementability by n-BD schemes, by n-ID schemes, and by n-ADF schemes. In particular, the increasing di¤erences monotonicity condition in Theorem 6 translates into the monotonicity of marginal price (i.e., condition 2 in Theorem 2) in the context of n-ID schemes, and translates into the monotonicity of minimum purchase and marginal price (i.e., condition 3 in Theorem 3) in the context of n-ADF schemes.
Concluding remarks
We compare maximum pro…ts of bundling, incremental discounts and all-units discounts in the context of monopolistic nonlinear pricing. The comparison hinges on whether the number of pricing blocks is restricted. We also develop a theory of menu implementability for general principal-agent settings.
Our comparison among bundling (BD), incremental discounts (ID) and all-units discounts with …xed fee (ADF) in the context of nonlinear pricing sheds lights on a general issue: how should an uninformed principal choose among di¤erent practical contract forms to o¤er to an informed agent? If the level of contract complexity and communication between the principal and the agent are unlimited, it is well known that restricting to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss. A heuristic reason is that direct revelation mechanisms have full control over the agent's action once the agent's private information is reported. Hence, under appropriately chosen direct revelation mechanism, the harm of private information is minimal. However, when contract complexity or communication is limited, it might pay to leave certain kind of ‡exibility or discretion power to the agent.
The above trade-o¤ between control and ‡exibility explains the ranking among BD, ID and ADF. BD exhibits the largest control: each option speci…es a single quantity. ID exhibits the smallest control: a two-part tari¤ does not directly control quantity, but only control indirectly through a marginal price. ADF is somehow in the middle: a minimum purchase tari¤ controls quantity through both a direct instrument, minimum purchase, and an indirect instrument, marginal price. This is why when the number of blocks (contract complexity) is unrestricted, BD has the largest and ID the smallest implementation power (Theorem 4 and Corollary 2). When the number of blocks is restricted, ID leaves certain kind of ‡exibility (one constrained by price) to the agent. Leaving ‡exibility to the agent, or giving up some control, in general may or may not be good since the agent has di¤erent interest from the principal. However, if the control loss implied by such kind of ‡exibility can be fully overcome when the number of blocks is unrestricted (i.e., = ID 1 ), then this kind of ‡exibility must help the approximation to second best. This is why ID has the largest approximation power (Theorem 5 and the paragraph thereafter).
The lesson is: when contract complexity is limited for practical concerns, the principal might gain from leaving to the agent some kind of ‡exibility that is nonbinding under unlimited contract complexity.
Proof. We must show that if 1 (q)
. Let 1 ( 1 ) and 2
( 2 ). Notice that inf 1 = cl ( 1 ) and
, both sides of (6) are not 1 1 and hence are well de…ned.) (6) implies inf 2 (q 1 ) < 1 and inf 1 (q 2 ) < 1. Since 2 (x) < 1 i¤ x 2 2 , we have inf 2 (q 1 ) = lim inf
Now, (6) implies that lim sup
Thus, there exist sequences q m 1 ! q 1 on 2 and q m 2 ! q 2 on 1 such that, for all m,
Proof of Theorem 6. Fix any (n; C) and any outcome (Q; T ). Suppose that the conditions in the theorem are satis…ed. Consider the menu M = f g 2 n f out g C. Then jMj n (from condition 4) and condition 1 in De…nition 1 are satis…ed (from condition 1). Suppose by way of contradiction that (Q; T ) is not menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then condition 2 in De…nition 1 is violated, i.e.,
for some 1 2 , q 0 2 , 0 2 f g 2 [ f out g.
In (7), if 0 = out , then q 0 = 0 (otherwise the right-hand side is 1), then the right-hand side is 0, contradicting to the IR of (Q; T ). Therefore 0 = 2 for some 2 2 .
Let 0 \ Q ( ) ; Q [ fq 0 g . For any 2 and any tari¤ option , we de…ne
fS (q; ) (q)g ; D + ( ; ) arg max q2 0 fS (q; ) (q)g :
For any 2 , we have Q ( ) 2 D ( ; ) and hence U ( ) S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) = V ( ; ), due to conditions 1 and 2. Then S (q; ) (q) must be upper semicontinuous in q at Q ( ), and hence (Q ( )) = inf (Q ( )). Then Q ( ) 2 D inf ; . Since Q ( ) 2 0 , we also have Q ( ) 2 D + inf ; . It follows that
For any ; 0 2 , D + inf 0 ; is nonempty since 0 is compact and the objective function is upper semi-continuous in q (from the continuity of S ( ; ) and the lower semi-continuity of inf 0 ). Also, clearly V + inf
In other words, the value of U ( ) is strictly below the value of V + inf 2 ; at 1 , but the values of these two functions are equal at 2 . By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, U ( ) is absolutely continuous, and U 0 (x) = S (Q (x) ; x) for almost every x 2 . By Envelope Theorem (in the version of Milgrom and Segal (2002)), V + inf 2 ; is absolutely continuous, and @V + inf 2 ; x =@x = S d + inf 2 ; x ; x for almost every x 2 , where d + inf 2 ; is any selection from
. It follows that, if 1 < 2 , then there is some
Increasing di¤erences monotonicity (condition 3) and Lemma 2 imply that S (q; ) inf 0 (q) satis…es increasing di¤erences in (q; 0 ). By monotone comparative statics (see Topkis (1978) or Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ), we obtain that, given any 2 , D + inf 0 ; is nondecreasing in 0 in the strong set order s . (For any D 1 ; D 2 R, D 1 s D 2 i¤ d 1 2 D 1 and d 2 2 D 2 imply min fd 1 ; d 2 g 2 D 1 and max fd 1 ; d 2 g 2 D 2 .) If 0 < , then D + inf 0 ; s D + inf ; , then there is some d 2 D + inf 0 ; such that d Q ( ). (Recall that Q ( ) 2 D + inf ; and D + inf 0 ; is nonempty.) Similarly, if 0 > , then there is some d 2 D + inf 0 ; such that d Q ( ). Now, we pick a selection d + inf 0 ; from D + inf 0 ; such that
It contradicts to our previous claim when we take 0 as 2 and as x 0 .
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof of Theorem 6 still goes through except the last paragraph, which is now replaced by the following. Since d + inf 2 ; x is some selection of D + inf 2 ; x 0 , there exists a sequence fd i g on ( 2 ) such that d i ! d + inf 2 ; x 0 and S (d i ; x 0 ) 2 (d i ) ! V + inf 2 ; x 0 . Consider 1 < 2 . From our previous claim (in the proof of Theorem 6), for all large enough i, we have
Let i be large enough so that the above properties hold. Since U (x 0 ) S (d i ; x 0 )
. On the other hand, condition 3'b implies x 0 (Q (x 0 )) = T (x 0 ) 2 (Q (x 0 )). Then single crossing monotonicity (condition 3'a) implies
We have a contradiction. By an analogous argument, the case of 1 > 2 also yields a contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 8 requires the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3 If an outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C), with either n …nite or C [ f out g closed, then the associated menu M (that is contained in C, has at most n elements, and induces (Q; T )) can be chosen such that 1. for any q 2 , arg min 2M[f outg (q) is nonempty, and 2. the tari¤ options in M do not dominate one another.
Proof. Suppose that (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C), i.e., (Q; T ) is induced by some menu M C with jMj n. Let : ! R [ f 1; 1g denote the lower envelope of M [ f out g, i.e., (q) inf 2M[f outg (q).
If n is …nite, then M [ f out g is a nonempty …nite set. We delete any dominated tari¤ options in M so that condition 2 holds. After the deletion, M [ f out g is still a nonempty …nite set so that condition 1 holds, and the lower envelope of M [ f out g is the same as before so that (Q; T ) is still induced.
We hereafter suppose that n = 1 and C[f out g is closed. Let f 2 C [ f out g : g. Also, for any q 2 , we de…ne the following partial order q over tari¤ options: for any tari¤ options 1 ; 2 , we say 1 q 2 i¤ either 1 (q) < 2 (q), or 1 (q) = 2 (q) & 1 exists a family2 of tari¤ options such that every q is a minimal element of ( ; q ).
Regard2 n f out g as a menu. By our construction, this menu is contained in C. For any q; q 0 2 , q (q) = (q) q 0 (q). Thus this menu satis…es condition 1. Since2 and M [ f out g share a common lower envelope ,2 n f out g induces the same outcome as M does. Finally, if q is dominated by q 0 , then q is not a minimal element of , a contradiction. Therefore, our menu satis…es condition 2.
Lemma 4 If tari¤ options 1 ; : : : ; n do not dominate one another, and ( 1 ; 2 ), ( 2 ; 3 ), : : :, ( n 1 ; n ) and ( n ; 1 ) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property or tari¤ increasing di¤erences, then 1 = = n .
Proof. We will use the induction argument. Let n = 2 …rst. Suppose that 1 6 = 2 , and both ( 1 ; 2 ) and ( 2 ; 1 ) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property. Then pick some
x 2 such that 1 (x) 6 = 2 (x). Without loss of generality, assume 1 (x) < 2 (x).
Since ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property, 1 (q) 2 (q) for all q 2 with q < x. Since ( 2 ; 1 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property, 1 (q) 2 (q) for all q 2 with q > x. Therefore 2 is dominated by 1 . (If 1 (x) > 2 (x), one can prove that 1 is dominated by 2 .) Hence, the lemma holds for n = 2.
Assume the induction hypothesis: the lemma holds for n = 2; 3; : : : ; k. Suppose that 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; k+1 do not dominate one another, and ( 1 ; 2 ) ; ( 2 ; 3 ) ; : : : ; ( k ; k+1 ) and ( k+1 ; 1 ) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property. If i = j for some i; j 2 f1; : : : ; k + 1g with i 6 = j, then the induction hypothesis implies that 1 = = k+1 , and we are done. So suppose that 1 ; : : : ; k+1 are all distinct. Consider any i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Since i and i+1 are distinct and do not dominate each other, there exist x i ; y i 2 such that i (x i ) < i+1 (x i ) and i (y i ) > i+1 (y i ). Since ( i ; i+1 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property, x i < y i . Let I 2 arg min i2f1;:::;kg x i and J 2 arg max i2f1;:::;kg y i . Because ( 1 ; 2 ) ; : : : ; ( k ; k+1 ) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property, we have 1 (x I )
. But we also have x I < y J , hence ( k+1 ; 1 ) does not satisfy tari¤ single crossing property.
Remark 5 In fact, the proof of Lemma 4 only requires a weaker version of tari¤ single crossing property, namely, ( 1 ; 2 ) is said to satisfy this weaker version of tari¤ single crossing property if for any q 1 ; q 2 2 with q 1 < q 2 , we have 1 (q 1 ) 2 (q 1 ) whenever 1 (q 2 ) < 2 (q 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 8. Suppose that conditions (i) and (ii) hold and an outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then there exist some menu M C with jMj n and some mapping 7 ! in (M [ f out g) such that conditions 1 and 2 in De…nition 1 are satis…ed. Then clearly (Q; T ) is IC and IR.
Let f g 2 M [ f out g. By condition (i) and Lemma 3, we can without loss of generality assume that the tari¤ options in do not dominate one another. To introduce convenient notation, we write 1 E 2 if ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences. Obviously, E is a re ‡exive binary relation over tari¤ options. Increasing di¤erences comparability of C [ f out g (condition (ii)) carries over to (because C[ f out g). Thus, E is complete on . From Lemma 4, E is antisymmetric on
. From re ‡exivity, completeness and Lemma 4, E is transitive on . Therefore, E is a linear order on . It makes a chain. De…ne T ( ) as the set f 2 : (Q ( )) 0 (Q ( )) for any 0 2 g. T ( ) is nonempty because 2 T ( ) for every 2 (due to conditions 1 and 2 in De…nition 1). Let E s be the strong set order on induced by E. That is, for any two subsets T 1 ; T 2 of , we say T 1 E s T 2 if 1 2 T 1 and 2 2 T 2 and 2 E 1 imply 1 2 T 2 and 2 2 T 1 . Then E s is a partial order on the set P ( ) of nonempty subsets of .
We want to show that the mapping T is nondecreasing on (( ; ) ; (P ( ) ; E s )). Consider any 1 ; 2 2 such that 1 < 2 , and we need to show T ( 1 ) E s T ( 2 ). Suppose 1 2 T ( 1 ) and 2 2 T ( 2 ) and 2 E 1 . Let q 1 Q ( 1 ) and q 2 Q ( 2 ). From IC of (Q; T ), we have q 1 q 2 . From IR of (Q; T ), we have S (q 1 ; 1 ) 1 (q 1 ) S (q 1 ; 1 ) 1 (q 1 ) = S (q 1 ; 1 ) T ( 1 ) 0 so that 1 (q 1 ) < 1, and similarly 2 (q 2 ) < 1. Thus q 1 2 ( 1 ) and q 2 2 ( 2 ). Since 1 2 T ( 1 ) and 2 2 T ( 2 ), we have 1 (q 1 ) 2 (q 1 ) and 2 (q 2 ) 1 (q 2 ). Now it follows from 2 E 1 and q 1 q 2 that 1 (q 2 ) 2 (q 2 ) and 2 (q 1 ) 1 (q 1 ), and hence 1 2 T ( 2 ) and 2 2 T ( 1 ). Therefore, T ( 1 ) E s T ( 2 ). We conclude that the mapping T is nondecreasing on (( ; ) ; (P ( ) ; E s )).
Regard T as a correspondence from to . Our previous results show that T is nonempty-valued and nondecreasing (with respect to the strong set order induced by E), so that it has a nondecreasing selection 7 ! (see Kukushkin (2012) Theorem 2). Now this mapping 7 ! satis…es conditions 3 and 4 in Theorem 6. It satis…es condition 1 in Theorem 6 because T ( ) = (Q ( )) = min 0 2 0 (Q ( )) = (Q ( )) for any 2 . It also satis…es condition 2 in Theorem 6 because S (Q ( ) ; ) (Q ( )) = S (Q ( ) ; ) (Q ( )) S (q; ) (q)
for any 2 and any q 2 . It completes the proof of the …rst part. For the second part, assume condition (ii') instead of condition (ii). The above proof still goes through except that the binary relation E requires to be rede…ned: 1 E 2 if and only if ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ single crossing property.
Proof of Theorem 1. Simply notice that, from Fact 1, if (Q; T ) is IC and Q ( ) is constant over an interval, then T ( ) is also constant over that interval.
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 require the following lemmas, which characterize the closures 13 of the set of two-part tari¤s and the set of common-…xed-fee minimum purchase tari¤s. 14 Lemma 5 A tari¤ option^ is the pointwise limit of some net of two-part tari¤s if and only if either (^ ) = f0g (i.e., the domain of^ is f0g), or^ is a two-part tari¤.
Proof. The "if" part is quite obvious, so we only prove the "only if" part. Let f g be a net of two-part tari¤s, with each characterized by p ;
. Suppose that it pointwise converges to a tari¤ option^ . Since each is nondecreasing,^ is too. Then^ (0) 6 = 1 (otherwise^ is not a tari¤ option) and^ (0) 6 = 1 (otherwise^ is 1 everywhere and hence not a tari¤ option). If^ (1) = 1, then^ (q) = 1 for all q > 0 (since each is linear), so that (^ ) = f0g. Now suppose that^ (1) is …nite. Then both^ ^ (0) andp ^ (1) ^ (0) are …nite. Moreover, we have = (0) !^ (0) =^ and p = (1) (0) !^ (1) ^ (0) =^ . Then, for any q 0, (q) (pq +^ ) = (p p)q + ( ^ ) ! 0:
Therefore, pointwise converges to q 7 !pq +^ , which is a two-part tari¤.
Lemma 6 Given 2 R, a tari¤ option^ is the pointwise limit of some net of minimum purchase tari¤s with common …xed fee if and only if either (^ ) = f0g and^ (0) = , or^ is a minimum purchase tari¤ with …xed fee , or^ is a "strictminimum purchase tari¤ with …xed fee " of the form
if 0 q m :
(Strict-minimum purchase tari¤s di¤er from minimum purchase tari¤s in that the order size has to be strictly larger than the minimum purchase.)
Proof. The "if" part is quite obvious, so we only prove the "only if" part. Let f g be a net of minimum purchase tari¤s, with each characterized by (m ; p ; ). Suppose that it pointwise converges to a tari¤ option^ . Since^ is a tari¤ option, its domain (^ ) is nonempty. If (^ ) = f0g, clearly^ (0) = . Suppose that (^ ) 6 = f0g. Let m inf (^ ) 0. Then m !m. For any q >m,^ (q) is the limit of fp q + g, and then^ (q) cannot be 1, for otherwise p ! 1 and hence (^ ) is either f0g or empty. Nowp ^ (m + 2) ^ (m + 1) is …nite. Moreover, for large , p = (m + 2) (m + 1) !^ (m + 2) ^ (m + 1) =p:
Therefore, for any q >m, we have^ (q) = lim (q) = lim (p q + ) =pq + . For any q <m, we have^ (q) = lim (q) = 1. The limit^ (q) of f (m)g must be either lim p q + =pq + or 1. We conclude that^ is the minimum purchase tari¤ or the strict-minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (m;p; ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let C be the set of all two-part tari¤s, and C be the closure of C, which is characterized by Lemma 5.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that P : A ! R + satis…es the conditions in this theorem. For each 2 , let be out if 2 A, and be the two-part tari¤ characterized by (P ( ) ; ( )) if 2 nA, where ( ) T ( ) P ( ) Q ( ). It su¢ ces to verify that the mapping 7 ! satis…es the su¢ cient conditions provided in Theorem 6. Notice that 1 < 2 and Q ( 2 ) = T ( 2 ) = 0 imply Q ( 1 ) = T ( 1 ) = 0, by IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1. Hence A is an increasing subset of . (That is, 1 2 A and 1 < 2 2 imply 2 2 A.) It, together with condition 2, implies that 7 ! satis…es condition 3 in Theorem 6. Condition 1 and the de…nition of A and imply conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 6. IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1 imply that, for any 2 A and 2 ,
where U ( ) S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ). If P ( ) is some constant p over an interval in A, then, for any ; in that interval,
where v (p; ) sup q 0 fS (q; ) pqg. Hence ( ) is constant over that interval. Therefore, condition 3 implies that condition 4 in Theorem 6 holds.
Necessity. Suppose that (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ID scheme. In other words, (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then (Q; T ) is also menu implementable with respect to n; C . 15 Notice that C [ f out g = C, which is closed. Take any 1 ; 2 2 C. If ( 1 ) = f0g, then ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences. If ( 1 ) 6 = f0g and ( 2 ) 6 = f0g (so that both 1 and 2 are two-part tari¤s), then ( 1 ; 2 ) (respectively ( 2 ; 1 )) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences if and only if p 1 p 2 (respectively p 2 p 1 ), where p i denotes the marginal price of i . Hence, C [ f out g is increasing di¤erences comparable. By Theorem 8, the conditions provided by Theorem 6 are satis…ed by some mapping 7 !
in C [ f out g . For any 2 such that 6 2 C [ f out g, by Lemma 5, ( ) = f0g, and hence Q ( ) = 0. Let 0 f 2 : Q ( ) = 0g. By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, every 2 0 has the same T ( ), which we denote as t 0 . If 0 is nonempty and t 0 = 0, then we rede…ne every with 2 0 as out . If 0 is nonempty and t 0 6 = 0, then we rede…ne every with 2 0 as a two-part tari¤ characterized by (p 0 ; t 0 ), such that consumers of type 2 0 would pick quantity q = 0 (this two-part tari¤ exists because (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ID scheme). Clearly this p 0 can be chosen to be higher than the marginal price of every other two-part tari¤ in f g 2 n 0 . Now the new mapping 7 ! is in (C [ f out g) and still satis…es the conditions provided by Theorem 6. Since f g 2 n f out g C, we can for each 2 A de…ne P ( ) as the marginal price of . Then conditions 1-3 follow from conditions 1-4 in Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let C be the set of all minimum purchase tari¤s with …xed fee , and C be the closure of C, which is characterized by Lemma 6.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that M : A ! R + and P : A ! R + satis…es the conditions in this theorem. For each 2 , let be out if 2 A, and be the minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (M ( ) ; P ( ) ; ) if 2 nA. It su¢ ces to verify that the mapping 7 ! satis…es the su¢ cient conditions provided in Theorem 6. Notice that 1 < 2 and Q ( 2 ) = T ( 2 ) = 0 imply Q ( 1 ) = T ( 1 ) = 0, by IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1. Hence A is an increasing subset of . It, together with condition 3, implies that 7 ! satis…es condition 3 in Theorem 6. Conditions 1 and 2 and the de…nition of A imply conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 6. Condition 4 implies that condition 4 in Theorem 6 holds. If in addition n = 1, clearly the function M can be chosen as the restriction of Q on A without a¤ecting the validity of conditions 1 and 3.
Necessity. Suppose that (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ADF scheme with …xed fee . In other words, (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then (Q; T ) is also menu implementable with respect to n; C . Notice that C [ f out g is closed since C is. Take any 1 ; 2 2 C [ f out g. If ( 1 ) = f0g, then ( 1 ; 2 ) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences. If ( 1 ) 6 = f0g and ( 2 ) 6 = f0g (so that both 1 and 2 are minimum purchase tari¤s or strict-minimum purchase tari¤s with …xed fee ), then they do not dominate each other if and only if either ( 2 ) is a proper subset of ( 1 ) and p 2 < p 1 , or ( 1 ) is a proper subset of ( 2 ) and p 1 < p 2 , where p i denotes the marginal price of i . In the …rst case (respectively second case), ( 1 ; 2 ) (respectively ( 2 ; 1 )) satis…es tari¤ increasing di¤erences. Hence, C [ f out g is increasing di¤erences comparable. By Theorem 8, the conditions provided by Theorem 6 are satis…ed by some mapping 7 ! in C [ f out g . For any 2 such that 6 2 C [ f out g, by Lemma 6, either is a strict-minimum purchase tari¤, or ( ) = f0g and hence Q ( ) = 0. For any 2 such that is a strict-minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (m ; p ; ), we rede…ne as the minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (m ; p ; ), so that 2 C and picking the original quantity q = Q ( ) is still optimal under the new for consumers of type (since S (q; ) is continuous in q). Let 0 f 2 : Q ( ) = 0g. By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, every 2 0 has the same T ( ), which we denote as t 0 . Clearly t 0 2 f0; g. If 0 is nonempty and t 0 = 0, then we rede…ne every with 2 0 as out . If 0 is nonempty and t 0 = , then we rede…ne every with 2 0 as a minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (0; p 0 ; ), such that consumers of type 2 0 would pick quantity q = 0 (this minimum purchase tari¤ exists because (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ADF scheme with …xed fee ). Clearly this p 0 can be chosen to be higher than the marginal price of every other minimum purchase tari¤ in f g 2 n 0 . Now the new mapping 7 ! is in (C [ f out g) and still satis…es the conditions provided by Theorem 6. Since f g 2 n f out g C, we can for each 2 A de…ne M ( ) and P ( ) as the minimum purchase and the marginal price of . Then conditions 1-4 follow from conditions 1-4 in Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 4. It follows from IC of (Q; T ), Fact 1 and U ( ) S (Q ( ) ; ) T ( ) = 0 that T ( ) = 0 whenever Q ( ) = 0. Therefore, A f 2 : (Q ( ) ; T ( )) 6 = (0; 0)g = f 2 : Q ( ) > 0g.
Part (a). It su¢ ces to construct 2 R, M : A ! R + and P : A ! R + such that conditions 1-3 in Theorem 3 hold. (The number n is taken as 1 so that condition 4 in Theorem 3 trivially holds.) For each 2 A, we let M ( ) Q ( ) and P ( ) (T ( ) ) =Q ( ), where the parameter 2 R is chosen to be small (i.e., negative with large magnitude). Then condition 1 in Theorem 3 holds and M is nondecreasing. Clearly, when is small enough so that P ( ) is large enough, condition 2 in Theorem 3 holds. Using IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, it is straightforward to verify that P is nonincreasing when is small enough. Hence condition 3 in Theorem 3 also holds.
Part (b). Suppose that (Q; T ) is 1-ID-implementable. By Theorem 2, there exists a nonincreasing function P ID : A ! R + such that
For each 2 , consumers of type are meant to pick the two-part tari¤ characterized
It remains to verify that the tuple (M; P AD ) satis…es conditions 1-3 in Theorem 3 when = 0. Clearly condition 1 in Theorem 3 holds.
Since consumers of type has no incentive to deviate to pick the two-part tari¤ for any type 2 A, we have
That is, is nonnegative. Pick any 2 A. By nonnegativity of ,
It, together with (9), implies Q ( ) 2 arg max q Q( ) S (q; ) P AD ( ) q 8 2 A:
That is, condition 2 in Theorem 3 holds. Since (Q; T ) is IC, by Fact 1, Q is nondecreasing. Hence M is nondecreasing. Pick any 1 ; 2 2 A with 1 < 2 . Since consumers of type 2 has no incentive to deviate to pick the two-part tari¤ for type 1 , we have T ( 2 ) P ID ( 1 ) Q ( 2 ) + ( 1 ). It, together with the monotonicity of Q and the nonnegativity of , implies that P AD ( 2 ) = T ( 2 ) Q ( 2 ) P ID ( 1 ) + ( 1 ) Q ( 2 ) P ID ( 1 ) + ( 1 ) Q ( 1 ) = T ( 1 ) Q ( 1 ) = P AD ( 1 ) :
That is, P AD is nonincreasing. Therefore, condition 3 in Theorem 3 holds.
Proof of Theorem 5.
In the following we prove part (a). The proof of part (b) is similar to but easier than the proof of part (a), and is omitted.
Suppose that = ID 1 . By Corollary 3, there exist some second best quantity function Q and some nonincreasing function P : f 2 : Q ( ) > 0g ! R such that Q ( ) 2 arg max q 0 fS (q; ) P ( ) qg (10) whenever Q ( ) > 0. By Assumption 2, Q ( ) is the unique solution of max q 0 H (q; ) for all 2 except possibly and . By Berge Maximum Theorem, Q is continuous on n ; . Let Q ADF n ; T ADF n be an n-ADF-optimal outcome with a …nite n. Apply Theorem 3. Q ADF n ; T ADF n is associated with some ; A; M; P as described in Theorem 3. Since M is nondecreasing, P is nonincreasing, and (M; P ) takes at most n values, we can let (M ( ) ; P ( )) = 8 > > < > > :
(m 1 ; p 1 ) if 2 1 . . . . . .
(m n 0 ; p n 0 ) if 2 n 0 where f 1 ; : : : ; n 0 g is a partition of A, n 0 n, each i (i = 1; : : : ; n 0 ) is nonempty, and i < j whenever 1 i < j n 0 and i 2 i and j 2 j ; m 1 m 2 m n 0 ; p 1 p 2 p n 0 :
Moreover, for 2 i , Q ADF n ( ) 2 arg max q m i fS (q; ) p i qg :
Claim 1: For every i = 1; : : : ; n 0 , exactly one of the following occurs: (I) Q ADF n ( ) > Q ( ) for all 2 i ; (II) Q ADF n ( ) < Q ( ) for all 2 i ; (III) there exists some i 2 i such that Q ADF n ( i ) = Q ( i ). To prove Claim 1, suppose …rst that both (I) and (II) are false. Then Q ADF n ( 1 ) > Q ( 1 ) and Q ADF n ( 2 ) < Q ( 2 ) for some 1 ; 2 2 i . Notice that Q is continuous (by Assumption 2) and nondecreasing, and Q ADF n is nondecreasing. If 1 < 2 , then there exists some i 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) such that Q ADF n ( i ) = Q ( i ). If 2 < 1 , then p i P ( 1 ) (otherwise Q ADF n ( 1 ) Q ( 1 ), a contradiction), and p i P ( 2 ) (otherwise Q ADF n ( 2 ) Q ( 2 ), a contradiction), and P ( 2 ) P ( 1 ) (because P is nonincreasing), and then P ( ) = p i on [ 2 ; 1 ], and then Q ADF n ( ) = Q ( ) for almost all 2 ( 2 ; 1 ) (otherwise Q ADF n is not n-ADF-optimal, a contradiction). Therefore, Claim 1 is true.
For every i = 1; : : : ; n 0 , we take i sup i if case I in Claim 1 occurs, and take i inf i if case II in Claim 1 occurs, and take i such that Q ADF n ( i ) = Q ( i ) if case III in Claim 1 occurs. Now we de…ne P ID n ( ) 8 > > < > > :
Clearly, P ID n : A ! R is nonincreasing because P is. We will construct an outcome Q ID n ; T ID n such that Q ID n ( ) = 0 for 2 nA;
Q ID n ( ) 2 arg max q 0 fS (q; ) P ( i ) qg for 2 i ;
T ID n ( ) = S Q ID n ( ) ; Z S Q ID n (x) ; x dx for 2 :
By Theorem 2, any such Q ID n ; T ID n is n-ID-implementable. Notice that S Q ID n ( ) ; T ID n ( ) = 0 S Q ADF n ( ) ; T ADF n ( ). In order to apply Lemma 1, we will prove, for every i = 1; : : : ; n 0 , that inf i < < i implies Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ), and that i < < sup i implies Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ). Pick any i = 1; : : : ; n 0 and any 2 i . Suppose that case I in Claim 1 occurs. Then sup i = i . If the constraint q m i is not binding in problem (11) for type i , then p i P ( i ) P ( ). Comparing (10), (11) and (12), we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ). If the constraint q m i is binding in problem (11) for type i , then Q ADF n ( ) = m i = Q ADF n ( i ) Q ( i ). Since P ( i ) P ( ), comparing (10) and (11), we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ( i ) = Q ID n ( i ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ). Suppose that case II in Claim 1 occurs. Then inf i = i . Then p i P ( i ) P ( ). Comparing (10), (11) and (12), we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ). Suppose that case III in Claim 1 occurs and the constraint q m i is not binding in problem (11) for type i . Then p i = S q Q ADF n ( i ) ; i = S q (Q ( i ) ; i ) = P ( i ). For inf i < < i , we have p i = P ( i ) P ( ), so that we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ) whenever Q ADF n ( ) Q ( ). If Q ADF n ( ) < Q ( ), then, for small " > 0 and x 2 ( "; ], we have Q ADF n (x) < Q (x) (since Q is continuous and Q ADF n is nondecreasing) and p i = P (x), and then Q ADF n is not n-ADF-optimal because Q ADF n (x) can be reselected as Q (x) for all x 2 ( "; ] to raise pro…t, a contradiction. For i < < sup i , we have p i = P ( i ) P ( ), so that we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ) whenever Q ADF n ( ) Q ( ). If Q ADF n ( ) > Q ( ), then, for small " > 0 and x 2 [ ; + "), we have Q ADF n (x) > Q (x) (again since Q is continuous and Q ADF n is nondecreasing) and p i = P (x), and then Q ADF n is not n-ADF-optimal because Q ADF n (x) can be reselected as Q (x) for all x 2 [ ; + ") to raise pro…t, a contradiction.
Suppose that case III in Claim 1 occurs and the constraint q m i is binding in problem (11) for type i . Then p i P ( i ) and m i = Q ADF n ( i ) = Q ( i ). For inf i < < i , we have Q ADF n ( ) = m i = Q ( i ). Since P ( i ) P ( ), we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ( i ) = Q ID n ( i ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ). For i < < sup i , we have p i P ( i ) P ( ), so that we can select Q ID n ( ) such that Q ADF n ( ) Q ID n ( ) Q ( ) whenever Q ADF n ( ) Q ( ). Repeating our previous logic, one can show that Q ADF n ( ) > Q ( ) is impossible. Apply Lemma 1, we see that ID n ADF n . If ID n = ADF n , then it must be the case that Q ADF n ; T ADF n and Q ID n ; T ID n make the same pro…t and Q ID n ; T ID n is n-ID-optimal. Then Lemma 1 implies that Q ADF n ( ) ; T ADF n ( ) = Q ID n ( ) ; T ID n ( ) for almost all 2 . It completes the proof of part (a).
